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Sydney Shoemaker’s ‘Subset Account’ offers a new take on determinable properties and the realization relation as well as a defense of non-reductive physicalism from the problem of mental causation.  At the heart of this account are the claims that 1) mental properties are determinable properties and 2) the causal powers that individuate a determinable property are a proper subset of the causal powers that individuate the determinates of that property.  The second claim, however, has led to the accusation that the effects caused by the instantiation of a determinable property will also be caused by the instantiation of the determinates of that property—so instead of solving the problem of mental causation, the Subset Account ends up guaranteeing that the effects of mental properties (and all other types of determinable property) will be causally overdetermined!
In this paper, I explore this objection.  I argue that both sides in this debate have failed to engage the question at the heart of the objection: Given that both a determinable property and its determinates have the power to cause some effect (E), does it follow that both will actually cause E when the relevant conditions obtain?  To make genuine progress towards answering this question, we need to take a serious look at the metaphysics of causation. With the debate properly reframed and issues about the metaphysics of causation front and center, I explore the question of whether the Subset Account is doomed to result in problematic causal overdetermination.  


1. The Subset Account of determinable properties and the realization relation
	There are determinable and determinate predicates—“having length” is an example of the former, while “having a length of precisely 2.5 millimeters” is an example of the latter. A predicate that is a determinable relative to one predicate might be a determinate relative to another; “being red” is a determinable of “being scarlet” while being a determinate of “being colored”. Although much more can be said about determinable and determinate predicates and the various relations between them​[1]​, I’m going to skip all that and move on to the following question: Are there determinable and determinate properties?  For someone who is ontologically serious about properties, the real question here is whether there are any determinable properties beyond what we might call the “maximally specific determinate properties”—i.e. determinate properties that do not, themselves, have any determinates.  In this paper, I examine a recent attempt to defend the existence of determinable properties given by Sydney Shoemaker.  For reasons that will become clear shortly, I will refer to Shoemaker’s account as the “Subset Account”.  
Many philosophers are drawn to the so-called “Eleatic Principle”—the idea that to be real is to possess causal powers.​[2]​  When it is applied to properties, the Eleatic Principle tells us that real properties make a causal difference to the particulars that instantiate them and that a “property” that makes no such difference isn’t really a property after all.  Many of the participants in the debate over the Subset Account (including Shoemaker himself) accept the Eleatic Principle; indeed, discussions of (and objections to) the Subset Account are typically carried out using the Eleatic Principle as a backdrop.  I will follow this trend and frame my investigation with the following assumption:

(E) Properties are individuated from one another in terms of the causal powers they contribute to whatever possesses them.  

A quick note: (E) is actually stronger than the Eleatic Principle, for the claim that properties are individuated by their causal powers is considerably stronger than the claim that properties must contribute causal powers to their bearers.  (For instance, it is consistent with the latter claim that the connection between a property and the causal powers it contributes is contingent.​[3]​)  This difference, however, is irrelevant for the purposes of this paper.
With assumption (E) in place, we can state the basic idea of Shoemaker’s Subset Account. The collection of causal powers individuating a given determinable property is a (non-empty) proper subset of the causal powers that individuate the various determinate properties of that determinable.​[4]​  (To be clear, this is a simplified statement of the Subset Account. For purposes of this paper, however, this simplified version captures what’s important about Shoemaker’s view.)  The causal powers of having mass, for example, are a proper subset of the causal powers of having a mass of exactly 2.5 grams.
Shoemaker uses the Subset Account of determinable properties to offer a new account of the realization relation and a solution to the problem of mental causation.  Simplifying greatly, the problem of mental causation arises in virtue of the claim that mental and physical properties are distinct from one another (as revealed by the phenomenon of multiple realizeability​[5]​) and the claim that the physical world is causally closed.​[6]​  Taken together, these claims seem to imply that mental properties are either causally irrelevant to physical effects (such as bodily movement) or that they causally overdetermine these effects along with various physical properties. (For the record, I think that the relata of the causal relation are events.  So strictly speaking, it is events (or instantiating of properties by particulars) that cause physical effects.  Talk of properties as causing effects is simply shorthand.)
Shoemaker (2001) claims that realized properties (such as mental properties) are always determinable properties and that the properties that realize them are determinates of those determinables.​[7]​  The relation between determinable and determinate properties, in turn, is explicated along the lines of the Subset Account—a determinable property is individuated by a proper subset of the causal powers that individuate its determinates.  
(Recently, Shoemaker has reformulated the connection between determinable/determinate properties, the realization relation, and the Subset Account (see Shoemaker 2007); he continues to explicate the realization relation along the lines of the Subset Account, but he now maintains that the relation between determinable and determinate properties is just one (special) case of the realization relation.  This change is irrelevant for the arguments of this paper.) This means that the causal powers that individuate a mental property are a proper subset of the causal powers that individuate its various physical realizers. Indeed, Shoemaker says we can think of a determinable property as being a part of each of its determinates.​[8]​ This, in turn, means that we can think of a mental property as being a part of each of its physical realizers.
How does treating a mental property as being a determinable property and treating the physical properties that realize it as being its determinates help with the problem of mental causation? In general, we do not think that wholes and their parts double up on one another with respect to various effects that each might bring about. Rather, depending upon the effect in question, sometimes we think that the whole caused it and sometimes we think that only a part of the whole caused it.  If determinable properties are parts of determinate properties, then these two kinds of property will not double up on one another and overdetermine their various effects.  (More carefully, the instantiations of each kind of property in a given particular will not overdetermine the same effect.) Rather, depending upon the effect in question, sometimes the determinate property will be the cause and sometimes the determinable property will be the cause. 
Shoemaker illustrates this idea using Yablo’s (1992) example of Sophie, a pigeon who has been trained to peck at red things.  Consider a case where Sophie pecks at a scarlet triangle— 

…given that Sophie’s pecking was a consequence of the instance of scarlet, we can ask whether what caused it was this instance as a whole or some proper part of it…And here it seems appropriate to say that it was a part of it, namely the instance of red, that did the causing, because it was the conditional powers conferred by that part that were relevant to the effect… (Shoemaker 2001, 81)

Following the lead of Yablo, Shoemaker claims that when dealing with determinate and determinable properties, causes should be proportional to their effects. In the case of Sophie, for instance, proportionality favors the determinable property of being red, not the determinate property of being scarlet, as the cause of Sophie’s pecking.  Why?  Because the property of being scarlet has too many causal powers that are irrelevant to Sophie’s pecking, while the property of being red does not.  
In summary, according to Shoemaker mental properties are not guaranteed to cause effects that are also caused by physical properties (even though mental properties are realized by physical properties).  Given that mental properties are determinable properties whose determinates are physical properties, and given that in the case of determinable/determinate properties causes should be proportional to their effects, then, depending upon the effect in question, either the mental property will be the cause or the physical property will be the cause, but not both.​[9]​

2. An objection to the Subset Account
There are a number of challenges that can be raised to the Subset Account.  For instance, does it really make sense to say that an instance of red is a part of an instance of scarlet?  And is the Subset Account view best described as a version of non-reductive physicalism given that it posits a common physical element (a determinable property, which is individuated by a subset of the causal powers that individuate various physical properties) to all tokens of a type of mental state?​[10]​  In what follows, however, I set these questions aside and focus on the following concern instead: Since mental properties (which are determinable properties) are individuated by a proper subset of the causal powers that individuate the physical properties that realize them (their determinates), isn’t it inevitable that the instantiation of these properties will causally overdetermine a range of effects?
	This concern has been voiced by a number of people. Consider, for example, what Carl Gillett and Bradly Rives (2005) say about the Subset Account. With the Eleatic Principle firmly in view, they claim that

…applying Occam’s Razor we should only posit as many properties as we need to account for the causal powers of individuals. (491) 

In this context, failure to abide by Occam’s Razor will result in positing properties whose causal powers are overdetermined.​[11]​  And this, in turn, leads to the charge that the effects of these properties will be causally overdetermined. 
Sven Walter (2007) also thinks that the Subset Account has a problem with overdetermination. (Walter expresses this concern in terms of epiphenomenalism, not overdetermination.  But in this context, the charge of overdetermination and the charge of epiphenomenalism are two sides of the same coin.)

…given such a framework, the reason why determinates screen off their determinables could be put as follows: The causal powers of determinables must be a subset of the causal powers of their determinates…which straightforwardly entails that determinates, in contrast to determinables, are guaranteed to contribute all required causal powers to their bearers (231, footnote 10)

And although he doesn’t end up endorsing this objection, McLaughlin (2007) says that the Subset Account—

…invites the question whether mental causation is always redundant.  The forward-looking causal features of any mental property will be a subset of the forward-looking causal features of each of its physical S-realizers…Given that, why wouldn’t mental causation be redundant causation, at least where the effects of the kinds specified in the forward-looking causal features of mental properties are concerned?  (156)

Indeed, even Shoemaker (2007) acknowledges that the Subset Account invites the charge of causal overdetermination.

It may seem that the account endorses an objectionable sort of overdetermination.  Suppose that one of the forward-looking causal features of P is its aptness in circumstances C to produce effect E, and that this is one of the causal features its shares with its realizers, including property Q.  And suppose P is instantiated in virtue of Q being instantiated, and that effect E is produced.  Won’t it be true on this account that two different property instantiations, that of P and that of Q, caused effect E?  And won’t this be overdetermination?  (13)

For what it’s worth, I have heard similar arguments given informally on a number of occasions.   
	What are we to make of this objection? First off, there is the obvious point that positing both determinate and determinable properties involves positing more properties than would be posited if we just posited determinate properties.  But the bare fact that the former option results in positing more properties isn’t damning as long as determinable properties don’t create any trouble.  The potentially damning objection is that positing determinable properties leads to trouble.  And the kind of trouble that is the focus of the above quotations (and that I want to focus on) is that of causal overdetermination.  
(There is another, related form of trouble looming here—namely, that positing determinable properties leads to the “double-counting” of causal powers (Gillett and Rives 2005) or a “piling problem” with respect to causal powers (Hofmann 2007).  The worry is that under the Subset Account a given object is guaranteed to have a set of causal powers twice over—once in virtue of having a particular determinable property and again in virtue of having the determinate of that determinable property.  I don’t want to take the time to explore this objection in any detail; instead, I will focus exclusively on the question of whether positing determinable properties leads to causal overdetermination.​[12]​) 
	At this point, I’d like to introduce some terminology: Let’s say that determinable properties would ‘earn their keep’ if their instantiation would cause various effects that would not be causally overdetermined by the instantiation of the corresponding determinate properties.  The charge that I am exploring is that under the Subset Account it’s inevitable that determinable properties will not earn their keep.  The argument goes like this: If (as the Subset Account mandates) a determinable property and its determinate both contribute a causal power to bring about the same effect (E), then when the relevant conditions obtain (i.e. the conditions that make the causal power operative) they will both cause E.  Hence, the causal overdetermination of E in those conditions is inevitable. 
This argument assumes that a given property’s status as a cause of E (in the relevant conditions) is settled by whether one of the causal powers individuating that property is the power to cause E.  Let’s label this idea as “”.

: When the relevant conditions obtain (i.e. the conditions that make the causal power operative), a property’s status as a cause of E is settled by whether the causal powers individuating it include the power to cause E. 

According to the Subset Account, both a determinable property and the corresponding determinate property have the power to cause (let’s say) E.  And according to , when the relevant conditions obtain, both these properties will cause E.  So E is causally overdetermined.
The problem with this argument for the overdetermination of E is that  is a nontrivial assumption about a property’s status as a cause of E.  Indeed, it is easy to read Shoemaker as offering a competing principle along the following lines—

: When the relevant conditions obtain (i.e. the conditions that make the causal power operative), a property’s status as a cause of E is settled by whether the causal powers individuating it 1) include the power to cause E, and 2) are, as a collection of causal powers, proportional to E.

 (and its appeal to proportionality) is controversial as a thesis about causation, but so is almost every other thesis about causation, including .  And, more importantly for our purposes, there’s nothing in the Eleatic Principle that favors  over .  It is consistent with the Eleatic Principle that an object could have two properties—a determinable property and one of its determinates—that are both individuated (in part) by the power to cause E and that one of the properties is operative as the cause of E while the other isn’t. 
So to press the objection that determinable properties will not earn their keep against the Subset Account, you need to argue for  and against . But the versions of this of objection that I’ve encountered seem to just assume the truth of ; they seem to just assume that since both a determinate property and its corresponding determinable are individuated by the power to cause E, they will both cause E when the relevant enabling conditions obtain.  Hence, as it is stated above (and as it is typically presented, at least in my experience), this objection against the Subset Account is seriously incomplete.  In order for this objection to have genuine bite, it is not enough to point out that both the mental property and the physical property that realizes it contain the power to cause E; you must also make the case that both properties will actually cause E when the relevant enabling conditions obtain.  And in order to make the latter argument, you need to go beyond the question of what causal powers each property has and delve into the actual metaphysics of causation.
	There’s a flipside to all this.  In order to defend the Subset Account from the objection that determinable properties will not earn their keep, you need an argument in favor of (something like)  and against .  To his credit, Shoemaker does provide some argument here—he tries to motivate the claim that causes should be proportional to their effects via intuitive examples (like the earlier one involving Sophie).​[13]​ But given that this claim about proportionality is the linchpin to repelling the charge that determinable properties will fail to earn their keep, Shoemaker says surprising little in favor of it.  
In addition to the concern that it is not adequately supported, there is a more general concern about Shoemaker’s appeal to proportionality.  To say that causes must be proportional to their effects is not to say anything about what causation is.  This, in turn, leads to doubts about whether proportionality is well motivated as a thesis about the metaphysics of causation—since we haven’t been told what causation is, we might wonder whether the claim that causes should be proportional to their effects really reflects a fact about the metaphysics of causation (as opposed to merely reflecting an explanatory preference).   Brian McLaughlin, for instance, states that 

…I myself think that rather than a constraint on causation, proportionality is a pragmatic constraint on explanation.  Too much causal detail or too little causal detail makes for a poor or misleading explanation in a context.  (2007, 165)

	Let me be clear about the complaint I’m levelling here.  I’m not complaining that there is no evidence for the idea that in some sense we should think of causes as being proportional to their effects.  I am willing to allow that the intuitive examples offered by Shoemaker (and Yablo) could be evidence in favor of treating proportionality as a pragmatic constraint on explanation (as McLaughlin claims).  My complaint, rather, is that the idea of proportionality is not univocally supported by the previously mentioned examples as a thesis about the metaphysics of causation.  To show that proportionality is a constraint on the actual metaphysics of causation (and to make some progress rebutting the charge that it is merely a pragmatic constraint on explanation), what we need (at a bare minimum) is an account of what causation is that supports the claim that causes are proportional to their effects.  But Shoemaker makes no attempt to say what causation is.​[14]​ Given how things stand, then, we cannot take it for granted that proportionality is well supported as a thesis about the metaphysics of causation.  
Let’s take a step back and review.  According to the Subset Account, a determinable property is individuated by a subset of the causal powers that individuate its various determinates.  One objection that has been levelled against this account is that since both a determinable property and its determinate are individuated by the power to cause (say) E, they will both cause E when the relevant enabling conditions obtain; in short, it is claimed that determinable properties will not earn their keep. To tell whether this objection has any real bite, we need to move beyond the fact that a determinable property and its determinate each have the power to bring about E and focus on the status of each of these properties as the actual cause of E.  In short, we need to delve into the metaphysics of causation.  To date, however, the debate has exhibited little movement in this direction: Opponents of the Subset Account tend to assume that causal overdetermination is an inevitable outcome of that position (in virtue of assuming the truth of something akin to ). Shoemaker, in turn, presents a defense of the idea that determinable properties will earn their keep that turns on a claim—that causes are proportional to their effects—that 1) does not itself receive much defense in Shoemaker’s writings, and 2) potentially flounders on the charge that it confuses epistemology for metaphysics.  
Can we remedy this disappointing stalemate?  We can, if we explicitly investigate the status of determinable and determinate properties as causes.  But there is a serious difficulty facing such a project—exploring the issue in this way requires getting clear on the metaphysics of causation and the metaphysics of causation is anything but clear. Fortunately, this difficulty is not insurmountable. While there is a panoply of theories of causation, there is a growing consensus that (viable) theories of causation fall into one of two basic camps: Causation-as-production and causation-as-counterfactual-dependence.  So although we can’t examine the question of whether determinable properties will earn their keep from the perspective of every extant theory of causation, we can explore it from the perspective of these two general camps on causation.  And, as we shall see, doing so allows us to reach some important conclusions about the Subset Account.  

3. The Subset Account and two notions of causation 
Ned Hall (2004) has recently argued that there are two basic varieties (or concepts) of causation.  He characterizes the distinction in the following way—

Causation, understood as a relation between events, comes in at least two basic and fundamentally different varieties.  One of these, which I call “dependence”, is simply that: counterfactual dependence between wholly distinct events.  In this sense, event c is a cause of (distinct) event e just in case e depends on c.  That is, just in case, had c not occurred, e would not have occurred.  The second variety is rather more difficult to characterize, but we evoke it when we say of event c that it helps to generate or bring about or produce another event e, and for that reason I call it “production”.  (225, his emphasis)

Hall characterizes production accounts of causation as accounts that are committed to the ideas of Locality (causes are connected to their effects via spatiotemporally continuous sequences of causal intermediaries), Intrinsicness (the causal structure of a process is determined by its intrinsic, non-causal character (together with the laws)), and Transitivity (causation is a transitive relation).​[15]​  For expositional simplicity, I will refer to these ideas as “L”, “I” and “T”.
How does Hall argue for the distinction between these two kinds of causation?  One challenge to counterfactual approaches to causation involves cases were there appears to causation even though the two events involved do not stand the appropriate counterfactual relation with one another.  Here’s a simple example of one such case—a case of ‘preemption’—taken from Hall 2004, 235:  Suzy and Billy both throw rocks at a glass bottle.  Both rocks are thrown accurately, but Suzy’s throw is made a split second before Billy’s and, thus, arrives at the bottle first and shatters it. It seems obvious that Suzy’s throw was the cause of the bottle’s breaking, but it is not true that if Suzy had not thrown the rock, the bottle would not have broken (due to Billy’s throw).  In response to cases like this, defenders of counterfactual theories of causation might be tempted to supplement their accounts with L or I.​[16]​ Indeed, Hall argues that supplementing counterfactual accounts with L or I is the best available strategy for dealing with these cases. 
But there is a problem with supplementing counterfactual accounts with L, I, and/or T.  Hall presents several other examples—examples of ‘double prevention’ and examples of causation of/by omissions—where the heart of the counterfactual approach (Dependence) ends up being at odds with L, I, and T.  Consider, for example, the following case of double prevention (taken from Hall 2004, 241-248): Suzy and Billy are piloting separate planes during a bombing run.  A third pilot—Enemy—comes into view and is shot down by Billy.  Suzy then completes her bombing run.  If Billy had not shot down Enemy, Enemy would have shot down Suzy and the bombing would not have occurred.​[17]​  It seems right to credit Billy with being a cause of Suzy’s successful bombing—after all, if he hadn’t shot down Enemy, Suzy would not have successfully completed her bombing mission.  As Hall argues, however, it’s difficult to see how the causal relation between Billy’s shooting down Enemy and Suzy’s bombing accommodates the ideas of L, I and T.  In short, there is an intuitive pull to say that causation is present (in virtue of a form of counterfactual dependence being present), but given the way the case is constructed accepting this intuition forces us to conclude that L, I, and T are false as theses about the nature of causation.  
The result is an uneasy dance between Dependence and L, I, and T: In some cases (like the above example of preemption), our intuitions say that causation is present despite the absence of counterfactual dependence.  (As mentioned earlier, Hall argues that the best response to these cases is to supplement the counterfactual approach with an appeal to L or I.)  But in other cases (like the above example of double prevention), our intuitions say that causation is present in virtue of the presence of a counterfactual dependence between events despite that counterfactual dependence being at odds with L, I, and T.  So what are we to make of all this?  Hall argues that what this uneasy dance shows is that “causation” is not a univocal concept—there is one concept of causation focused on the (unembellished) idea of counterfactual dependence, and another focused on the idea of production, as characterized by L, I, and T.  What the above examples reveal, in turn, are some of the ways in which these two concepts can come apart from one another.  
	Now that we’ve sketched Hall’s argument, let’s take a closer look at each conception of causation.  I take it that the basic idea of the counterfactualist account of causation is straightforward enough.​[18]​ But we need to hear a little more about the production account.  Toward that end, I turn to Jonathan Schaffer’s recent paper “Causes need not be Physically Connected to their Effects”.  In this paper, Schaffer explores the distinction between theories of causation that maintain that causes are “physically connected” to their effects and theories that do not (the counterfactualist approach being the leading version of the latter).​[19]​  The former theories I take to be (at least roughly) the same class of theories that Hall has in mind when he speaks of production accounts of causation.  To my ear, to say that causes are “physically connected” to their effects is awfully close to saying that there is something physical in causes that “generate or bring about or produce” their effects.​[20]​
Here is Schaffer’s brief, but useful, overview of theories that posit a physical connection between cause and effect:

There are three thematically related versions of the physical connections view.  First, there is the idea that causation requires transference, of a property, or more specifically of energy-momentum.  This idea has been developed by such philosophers as Jerrold Aronson (1971), David Fair (1979), and Hector-Neri Castaneda (1984).
Secondly, there is the idea that causation requires processes.  This idea traces back to Bertrand Russell (1948).  It was developed by Wesley Salmon (1984), who characterizes a causal process as a continuous qualitative persistence that is capable of transmitting a mark, of propagating structure.  This idea was further developed by Phil Dowe (1992, 1995, 2000; see also Salmon, 1994, 1998), who characterizes a causal process as a world-line of an enduring conserved-quantity-bearing object.
Thirdly, there is the idea that causation requires an intrinsic tie.  This idea had been developed by J.L. Mackie (1974).  Douglas Ehring (1997) specifies this tie as the persistence line of a trope, and Max Kistler (1998, 2001) further develops this thought, while bringing it closer to Dowe’s view, by restricting the persisting tropes to those of conserved quantities.
These three approaches owe their distinctive aspects as much to historical pedigree as to philosophical difference.  All understand physical connections as lines of persistence.  They differ only in what is said to persist: unspecified for Russell and Mackie, properties for Aronson, tropes for Ehring and Kistler, energy for Fair and Castaneda, structure for Salmon, and objects (those instantiating conserved quantities) for Dowe.  (203-204, his emphasis)

Let me summarize the discussion so far.  In order to assess whether determinable properties (as conceived of by the Subset Account) can earn their keep, I need to delve into the metaphysics of causation.  In doing so, I will follow Hall in thinking that (viable) theories of causation boil down to one of two general camps: Counterfactual dependence or production.  (And I will follow Schaffer in thinking of the latter camp as positing a physical connection between cause and effect). I will not argue for Hall’s claim nor will I attempt to provide a more thorough characterization of the two camps beyond what I have already done.  For this reason, the conclusions I ultimately reach about the Subset Account will be contingent upon Hall’s conclusion and will also be a little open-ended.  But, as I mentioned earlier, there is a growing consensus that Hall’s conclusion is sound, so it is my hope that in assuming it I will not be offending too many of my readers.  (It is worth noting that a prominent reductionist (Kim 2007) and a prominent non-reductionist (Loewer 2007) have both accepted Hall’s conclusion.) 
With these assumptions in place, let’s return to the question of whether determinable properties will earn their keep.  Following Shoemaker, let’s focus on the specific question of whether determinable properties will earn their keep as causes of determinable effects.  Given that both a determinable property and the corresponding determinate property will have the power to cause a determinable effect E, is there something about the nature of causation (viewed as counterfactual dependence or viewed as production) that disqualifies the determinate property as the actual cause of E?
For expositional purposes, I will frame my investigation of this question around the following case:

A building is built in such a way that it can survive an earthquake that registers lower than 5 on the Richter scale but is guaranteed to collapse given an earthquake that registers at 5 or greater.  An earthquake of a magnitude of 5.4 occurs and the building collapses.​[21]​

We are assuming that there are both determinate and determinable properties in the mix.  This means that the collapse of the building involves a determinable and a determinate event: The determinable event of the building’s (general) collapse and the determinate event of the specific way the building collapsed.  Our focus is on the determinable event of the building’s collapse.  There is both a determinate event (an 5.4 earthquake) and a determinable event (a 5 or greater earthquake) on the scene with the power to cause the determinable event of the collapse.  So does that mean that they are both causes of that collapse?  Setting appeals to proportionality aside, is there anything about the metaphysical nature of causation that disqualifies the determinate event as the cause of the determinable collapse?  

3.1. The collapse, viewed from the counterfactualist perspective
In this subsection, I explore the question of what the building’s collapse looks like from the perceptive of a counterfactualist about causation.  Before doing this, however, I want to acknowledge that there are serious questions about how well-suited, in general, counterfactualist accounts of causation are to discussions of mental causation.  Here’s the concern: If we treat causation as being a relatively simple form of counterfactual dependence, then Cartesian Dualism, parallelism, and epiphenomenalism could all be consistent with mental causation. (Under all of these theories, there can be a counterfactual dependence between mental events and physical events which, given a counterfactualist account of causation, means that the former events cause the latter events.​[22]​) But this result is odd; intuitively, the first theory of mind is supposed to present a major obstacle to mental causation, while the latter two are actually supposed to be inconsistent with it.​[23]​  Although this is a serious concern, I will not explore it any further in this paper.  Instead, I will focus on the more specific question of what the Subset Account looks like when it is wedded to a counterfactualist account of causation. I will show that regardless of the viability of counterfactualist accounts of mental causation in general, there is something particularly worrisome about the marriage of the Subset Account and counterfactualism. 
With that out of the way, let’s turn our attention back to the collapse of the building.  For a counterfactualist about causation, the question of which event causes the (determinable) collapse transforms into the following: Which event does the (determinable) collapse of the building counterfactually depend upon? The answer is that the collapse counterfactually depends on the (determinable) event of a 5 or greater magnitude earthquake and not on the (determinate) event of a 5.4 earthquake—after all, had the earthquake registered at 5.3 or at 5.5 the building still would have collapsed.  
Let me put this point a bit more carefully. Under the Lewis/Stalnaker account of counterfactuals, A counterfactually depends upon B iff A and B both occur and at the closest possible world where A does not obtain, B does not obtain (where “A” and “B” are distinct events).​[24]​  Applying this account to the case at hand, we get the following: The determinable event of the collapse counterfactually depends on a 5.4 earthquake iff at the closest possible world without a 5.4 earthquake the building does not collapse.  I assume that a possible world that is just like ours but with a 5.3 or a 5.5 earthquake is the relevant closest world.  In that world, however, the building would still collapse. (Of course, in that world the building will not collapse in exactly the same way that it does in this world.  But this fact is irrelevant if what we are looking for is the cause of the determinable event of the building collapsing.) 
So if we conceive of causation as counterfactual dependence, then even though the 5.4 earthquake has the power to cause the determinable effect of the collapse, it doesn’t actually end up being the cause of that collapse.  Since it fails to stand in the appropriate counterfactual relationship to the (determinable) collapse, the (determinate) event of a 5.4 earthquake is disqualified as the cause of that collapse.  This result generalizes beyond the example at hand: If we add determinable properties to a metaphysical worldview that conceives of causation as counterfactual dependence, 1) these determinable properties will cause certain determinable effects and 2) determinate properties will be disqualified as causes of those same effects.​[25]​  In short, if we view causation as being counterfactual dependence, then determinable properties will earn their keep as causes of determinable effects.​[26]​
	Despite procuring the claim that determinable properties will earn their keep, there is a serious problem with combining the Subset Account with a counterfactualist account of causation.  If we think causation is counterfactual dependence, then there isn’t a problem of mental causation in the first place.  To put it another way, the presence of overdetermination in mental causation is worrisome only if you view causation as production.  As Barry Loewer (2007) puts the point:

…if causation is understood as production then it does seem that causal exclusion is, as Kim says, “virtually analytic”.  If P(y,t) produces Q(y,t) how can a distinct event M(y,t) also produce Q(y,t)?  As Kim likes to put it, there is “no work for a distinct mental event to do”….It seems obvious that if the brain event produces the bodily motion, a distinct mental event has nothing more to do.  (253, his emphasis)

…there is no problem of overdetermination if causation is understood as dependence.  On Lewis’s account of counterfactuals a particular event (or the value of a range of possible events) can depend on many co-occurring events.  The motions of one’s body, for example, the motions of a person’s arms and hands when reaching into the refrigerator, depend counterfactually both on her mental states (which snacks she wants) and on her brain (and other bodily) states and on a myriad of other states and events…there is no temptation to say if B depends on P it can’t also depend on M since “there is no work for M to do”.  (255-256)

If we view causation as production, then it’s genuinely worrisome if our theory entails that two distinct events (a mental event and a physical event) are each producing the same effect.  If the physical event is perfectly capable of producing the effect on its own, then it appears that the mental event “has no work to do”.  If, in contrast, we view causation as counterfactual dependence, the fact that the same effect counterfactually depends upon two distinct events (a mental event and a physical event) doesn’t generate the same intuitive concern about the mental event “having no work to do”.  For if we view causation as counterfactual dependence, we’re not saying that each of these events generates the same effect (and thus that each of these events essentially “does the same work” to bring that effect about).  Rather, we’re only saying that there is a relationship of counterfactual dependence between each of these events and the effect.​[27]​
	At the heart of all counterfactualist accounts is the idea that causation is a form of counterfactual dependence between distinct events.  And, as we have just seen, if causation is just counterfactual dependence, then there isn’t really a problem of mental causation in the first place, for under counterfactualist accounts of causation, the fact that an effect has multiple causes isn’t especially problematic.  Earlier, we saw that if we combined a counterfactualist account of causation with the Subset Account, determinate properties will be disqualified as the causes of determinable effects, thus ensuring that determinable properties will be the only causes of those effects. But now we see that the key ingredient in securing the claim that determinable properties will earn their keep—namely, the claim that causation is counterfactual dependence—ends up dissolving any worries we might have had about an effect having multiple causes in the first place.  For if causation is just a form of counterfactual dependence, then the possibility that an effect might be caused by (i.e. counterfactually depend upon) two or more events is no longer intuitively problematic.  So when the Subset Account is combined with a counterfactualist approach to causation, the counterfactualist approach dissolves the problem of causal overdetermination and the question of whether there is an effect (such as the building’s collapse) that is caused by both a determinable and a determinate event no longer matters.  
If this line of thought is correct, then as a solution to the problem of mental causation the Subset Account ends up being pointless when it is wedded to a counterfactualist account of causation.  It’s pointless because the claim that allows the Subset Account to defend itself from the charge of problematic overdetermination—namely, the claim that causation is counterfactual dependence—ends up dissolving the very problem that the Subset Account (and its appeal to proportionality) was intended to be a solution to.  If causation is mere counterfactual dependence, then there is no such thing as problematic causal overdetermination and, hence, no “problem” for the Subset Account to solve.  (This is not to say that the Subset Account is pointless tout court.  It could still have benefits besides its account of mental causation, benefits that are unscathed by the above argument.​[28]​)  

3.2. The collapse, viewed from the productionist perspective
Now consider the collapse of the building from the perspective of someone who thinks of causation as production.  For expositional simplicity, let’s work with a (simplified) version of the productionist account that posits that causes and effects are physically connected in virtue of the transference of energy from cause to effect.​[29]​  Under such an account, the question “what caused the (determinable) collapse?” transforms into the question “where did the energy responsible for the (determinable) collapse come from?” 
According to the Subset Account, both the determinable event of a 5 or greater earthquake and the determinate event of a 5.4 earthquake have the power to cause the determinable event of the collapse.  As we saw in the preceding section, when we conceive of causation as being counterfactual dependence the determinate event of the 5.4 earthquake ends up being disqualified as the actual cause of the (determinable) collapse. But under the energy-transference account, the fact that the earthquake was precisely 5.4 and thus contained more than enough energy to ensure the collapse of the building does not disqualify that fully determinate event as being the cause of the (determinable) collapse; the fact that the (determinable) effect of the building’s collapse would have occurred even if the earthquake had registered 5.3 or a 5.5 on the Richter scale is simply irrelevant to the question of whether the 5.4 earthquake was the cause of that collapse.  
So unlike the counterfactual conception, under the energy-transference conception of causation there’s nothing that disqualifies the determinate event (the 5.4 earthquake) as the cause of the determinable collapse.  This, in turn, means that there is a legitimate worry about the causal overdetermination of that collapse—both the determinable earthquake and the determinate earthquake have the power to cause it (in that both events have enough energy to cause it) and nothing in the metaphysical nature of causation (understood as energy-transference) disqualifies either of these events as being the actual cause of it.  
This result extends to productionist accounts beyond the energy-transference account.  For under all production accounts of causation, the question about the cause of the (determinable) collapse is a different kind of question than it is under counterfactual accounts.  Under production accounts, causation involves a physical connection between cause and effect or a line of persistence connecting cause to effect.  (As noted earlier, there are competing accounts of what persists: perhaps its energy, structure, a trope, a property, an object, etc.)  In identifying the cause of a given effect, what matters is the question of where the effect receives the thing (be it energy, structure, a trope, a property, an object, etc) that connects it to its cause.  Once we’ve identified where a given effect received this persisting entity from, we’ve determined its cause.  And, as we have seen, when we conceive of causation in this manner there’s nothing that disqualifies the 5.4 earthquake as being the cause of the (determinable) collapse. 
I have shown that, when it is viewed as production, there is nothing in the metaphysics of causation that disqualifies the 5.4 earthquake as being the cause of the (determinable) collapse.  In response to this point, it could be claimed that there is something else—something outside of the metaphysics of causation—that disqualifies the 5.4 earthquake as the cause of the (determinable) collapse.  If this were the case, the claim that there is nothing in the metaphysics of causation that disqualifies the 5.4 earthquake as being the cause would not guarantee that the (determinable) event of the building’s collapse is causally overdetermined.  
Of course, the suggestion that something else might disqualify the 5.4 earthquake as the cause of the (determinable) collapse is a promissory note that needs to be cashed.  Part of the difficulty in cashing this note is that attempts to disqualify the 5.4 earthquake as the cause of the (determinable) collapse that aren’t grounded in the metaphysics of causation run the risk of confusing epistemology for metaphysics. Consider, for example, a position that views causation as production and that posits that causes must be proportional to their effects.  According to this position, determinate events would be disqualified as the causes of determinable effects by something (the appeal to proportionality) that is separate from the metaphysics of causation, for there is nothing in the basic idea that causation involves a line of persistence connecting cause to effect that supports the claim that causes should be proportional to their effects.​[30]​  But now the concern, discussed earlier in this paper, about proportionality merely reflecting a pragmatic constraint on explanation, and not a genuine constraint on causation, kicks in.  The fact that citing the 5.4 earthquake as the cause of the (determinable) collapse violates a pragmatic constraint on explanation doesn’t explain what, in fact, disqualifies this event as being the cause of the determinable collapse.  
To be fair, there could be other ways of motivating something like the proportionality constraint, ways that do not flounder on the charge of confusing epistemology for metaphysics.​[31]​ Consider, for instance, a productionist account that understands causation in terms of the persistence of a trope.  Under such an account, the identity conditions of tropes might dictate that only determinable events can cause determinable effects.  More specifically, if the causation of a determinable event involves the persistence of a determinable trope, you might think that the cause must be a determinable event—i.e. the event that instantiates the previously mentioned determinable trope.  The problem with this line of reasoning, however, is that it assumes that the identity conditions of tropes will guarantee that a determinate trope cannot persist as a determinable trope.  In order to cash out the promissory note completely, you need an actual argument for thinking that tropes are individuated in way that prohibits a determinate trope from persisting as a determinable trope.  
The previous discussion contains an important lesson.  Any productionist account that wishes to defend something like the proportionality constraint inherits the burden of producing an argument that shows that this constraint is not motivated solely by epistemic or pragmatic considerations.  In absence of such an argument, there is a legitimate concern that, under productionist accounts of causation, a determinable effect receives what it needs (be it energy, structure, a trope, a property, an object, etc.) twice over.  Under productionist accounts, then, worries about the Subset Account leading to causal overdetermination are well placed.  

4. Conclusion: An assessment of the Subset Account and the charge of causal overdetermination
	The Subset Account offers a new way of understanding determinable properties and their relationship to determinate properties.  It also offers a new way of understanding the realization relation and a (relatively) new solution to the problem of mental causation that plagues non-reductive physicalism.  At the heart of this account is the claim that the causal powers that individuate a determinable property are a proper subset of the causal powers that individuate the various determinates of that property. This claim, however, has lead some to claim that the Subset Account is guaranteed to result in causal overdetermination; it is claimed that the Subset Account guarantees that when a mental property causes some effect (E) so will the physical property that realizes it.  
I have argued that in order to make real progress in evaluating this objection, we need to move beyond the fact that both mental property and physical property have the power to cause E and focus our attention on the question of which property actually causes E.  And to accomplish this, we need to delve into the metaphysics of causation.  Following the lead of Hall (2004), I have assumed that all (viable) theories of causation fall into one of two basic camps: Causation-as-production or causation-as-counterfactual-dependence.  With this assumption in place, I examined the question of whether determinable properties will earn their keep as causes of determinable effects.  
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